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Using a survey study of 261 decisions under uncertainty, we explore the factors that 
explain risk taking behavior and those that predict the importance of a decision. We also 
examine the relationship between framing and status quo, the similarity between monetary 
and non-monetary decisions, as well as the similarities and differences among our three 
subject groups (Undergraduates, MBAs and Executives). We find that framing, domain, and 
probability of success have a strong influence on the probability of taking risks. Other 
factors, such as group, importance of a decision, and whether the consequences are monetary 
or not, do not seem to influence risk attitudes. Our analysis of importance of a decision 
highlights the frequency with which a decision is taken as a key variable. Our results suggest 
that the cumulative effects of unimportant and frequent decisions are greater than the 





























A considerable amount of theoretical and, above all, empirical research has 
been dedicated to the analysis of decisions under uncertainty during the past few 
decades (see surveys from Camerer 1995; Luce 2000; Wu, Zhang, and Gonzalez, 
2004). By and large, most of the evidence comes from experimental studies where 
subjects face choices designed by experimenters (Wu et al., 2004). The few studies that 
use field data typically focus on specific domains (Fagley and Miller, 1990; Camerer 
2000; Rettinger and Hastie, 2001) or are qualitative in nature (March and Shapira 1987; 
Nutt 1998). The present study pushes forward this line of research by reporting the 
results of a survey that examines different aspects of decisions under uncertainty. 
Moreover, these decisions cover a large range of domains, importance, and type of 
consequences. Our main goal is to study the drivers of risk averting/taking behavior, 
and compare our survey findings with those from laboratory research. A second goal is 
to present an original study that relates the importance of decisions with several factors 
such as frequency, domain, and group. 
Adam Smith (1776, I.10, 29-34), in his book The Wealth of Nations, was 
among the first scholars to speculate about the factors that influence individuals’ risk 
taking behavior. His findings were further developed by decision theorists, according to 
whom the magnitude of outcomes and their probabilities, together with stable risk 
preferences over outcomes, were the major factors that influence risk taking behavior 
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Clemen, 1997). Behavioral decision theory has expanded the 
list of relevant drivers of risk attitudes. A major factor is framing (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), followed by other aspects such as the domain of the decision (Hershey 
and Schoemaker 1980, 1994; March and Shapira, 1987), elicitation procedures 
(Schoemaker, 1990), the use of hypothetical versus real monetary payoffs (Camerer 
and Hogarth, 1999), differences between monetary and non-monetary consequences 
(Fagley and Miller, 1997), the affect experienced at the moment of decision making 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001), and individual-specific differences in 
risk taking behavior (Fong and Wyer, 2003). 
Framing is important. People perceive outcomes as differences to some 
psychologically relevant point of reference, rather than absolute wealth levels 
(Markovitz, 1952; Edwards 1954; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levin, Gaeth, and 
Schreiber, 2002). The reference point induces people to frame outcomes in terms of  
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losses (i.e., negative deviations from the status quo) or gains (i.e., positive deviations 
from the status quo), rather than final levels of wealth. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
argued that framing produces a reflection effect in risk-taking behavior. Outcomes 
framed as gains induce risk aversion, and outcomes framed as losses induce risk 
seeking behavior. This reflection effect has been validated by many studies 
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Baucells and Heukamp, 2004). Further, it has been found to be 
relevant in qualitative research on managerial risk taking (March and Shapira, 1987) 
and helpful in explaining some real-life economic paradoxes (Camerer, 2000). Closely 
related to framing is status quo or the alternative seen as the default alternative 
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). In experimental settings, framing, status quo and other 
factors are manipulated or induced. It is important to see if the effects of framing and 
status quo replicate in environments where those factors are not manipulated 
experimentally. 
Factors other than framing may have psychological importance. For example, 
the significance of a decision’s domain (professional vs. private, or other finer 
classifications such as investment, career, leisure, etc…) on risk taking behavior has 
been timidly explored. Domain, of course, is a priori more difficult to characterize than 
framing, which explains why framing effects are better understood than domain effects. 
Most of the available studies consider only a few possible, exogenously given, domains 
(Fagley and Miller, 1990; Rettinger and Hastie, 2001). Our study provides further 
evidence for the importance of domain in explaining risk attitudes. 
Other approaches to the understanding of attitudes toward risk focused on 
individual differences such as aspects of personality and culture (Brockhaus, 1980; 
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Hsee and Weber, 1999; and Fong and Wyer, 2003). The 
extent to which these aspects have an influence on risk attitudes requires further 
investigation. 
A key assumption of behavioral research is that the insights obtained using 
monetary outcomes (hypothetical or real) will apply to non-monetary outcomes 
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Fagley and Miller (1997) compared the way people 
make choices in decisions involving monetary as opposed to non-monetary (human 
life) outcomes and concluded that framing is independent of whether the outcomes are 
monetary or non-monetary. However, not much is known about the relationship 
between risk attitudes and the type of consequence (monetary, comfort, convenience, 
time) of a decision. Since in reality many decisions are non-monetary, or a combination 
of non-monetary and monetary outcomes, it is important to measure the influence, or 
lack of influence, of the type of consequence. 
Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner (2002) considered the 
importance of using hypothetical versus real payoffs. Most experiments have used 
hypothetical payoffs or real payoffs (e.g. Schoemaker 1990) of relatively small 
magnitude (exceptions are Binswarger, 1980; Beetsma and Schotman, 2001). 
Methodologically, surveying field decisions yields insights that are not as sharp as 
laboratory decisions. However, it has the advantage that the payoffs are not restricted to 
small amounts and, more importantly, subjects experience the actual consequences of 
their decisions. 
In order to study these factors outside the laboratory, we approached three 
groups of subjects (undergraduates, MBAs and executives) and asked each of them to 
describe one recent real life decision. The description included qualitative dimensions 
(e.g., type of consequences, domain), quantitative dimensions (e.g., probability  
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estimates, monetary estimates of the magnitude of the consequences, frequency with 
which a decision is made) and subjective dimensions (framing and status quo). Finally, 
we asked our subjects to report their final choice (the safe or risky alternative). 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We found, as expected, 
differences in the three groups for the types of consequences and domains of decisions. 
While MBA students and executives were more concerned with professional decisions 
involving monetary outcomes, undergraduates reported mostly private decisions with 
non-monetary outcomes. Interestingly, there were no group differences in framing and 
status quo, and, more importantly, no group differences in risk attitudes, as measured 
by the percentage of subjects that choose the risky alternative. 
Using a binary logistic regression model, we were able to ascertain that risk 
prone behavior increases significantly when the safe alternative is perceived as a loss. 
Professional domain and the probability of success are two factors that increase the 
probability of taking risks. However, we found no significant difference between mixed 
and gains framing. Importantly, these conclusions hold irrespectively of whether the 
decision involves monetary or non-monetary outcomes. 
Besides factors that influence risk attitude, other dimensions of the decision 
deserve consideration. We thus performed an analysis of the factors that predict the 
importance of a decision. It has been suggested that the cumulative effects of small and 
seemingly irrelevant decisions can be huge (Hogarth, 2001, p. 264; 2004, p. 32). Our 
analysis goes one step further by addressing the question: Are the cumulative effects of 
unimportant but frequent decisions greater than the cumulative effects of very 
important but infrequent decisions? Using stakes as a measure of the importance of a 
decision, we were able to give a positive answer to this question. 
We found important group and domain differences: Executives make decisions 
that are six times more important than MBA students, who in turn face decisions that 
are twice as important as those made by undergraduates. Professional decisions are, on 
average, eight times more important than private decisions. Monetary decisions per se 
do not seem to be more important on average than other types of decisions. 
We were not the first to study decisions outside the laboratory. Hogarth 
(2004), for example, studied the effect of feedback on confidence in everyday decision 
making. He used ESM (Experience Sampling Method), i.e., subjects were requested to 
fill a short questionnaire reporting a recent decision at random times of the day; 
subjects were alerted by mobile phone messages. Beetsma and Schotman’s (2001) 
study using data from a television game show is another example. Massey (2004) 
studies risk behavior of employees by observing the timing of execution of their stock 
options. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey 
design, discusses the measurement, and performs a preliminary data analysis. Section 3 
explains the statistical results, including 1) an analysis of similarities and differences 
across the groups, 2) a logistic regression model analyzing the probability of making 
the risky choice, and 3) a linear regression model studying the importance of the 
decision. In Section 4 we discuss issues such as the relationship between status quo and 
reference points, the importance of daily versus yearly decisions, and other dimensions 
of a decision that influence risk attitudes. Section 5 concludes by relating our main 
findings with previous research.  





We distributed a questionnaire to three groups of participants (see Appendix 
B). The first group consisted of 77 undergraduate students from Duke University. The 
second group was made up of 131 MBA students at IESE Business School in 
Barcelona, Spain. The third group consisted of 53 executives who were enrolled in the 
executive education program at IESE Business School. Table 1 summarizes the 
different demographical characteristics of the undergraduates, MBA students (MBAs) 
and executives (Executives). 
 
2.2 Survey Design 
 
The questionnaire required subjects to describe a recent decision that involved 
two alternatives: a sure alternative S and a risky alternative R. Subjects were told to 
write down the outcome of the sure alternative. Next, we asked them to summarize the 
risky alternative in terms of two scenarios, a good luck scenario and a bad luck 
scenario, and describe their corresponding two outcomes, the “better outcome” and the 
“worse outcome”, respectively. 
Then, subjects were required to answer a number of questions which were 
intended to measure several dimensions of a decision. Some of those dimensions (e.g., 
p,  bw xx − ) correspond to the elements of a decision depicted in Figure 1, while others 
were meant to help us to further characterize a decision (e.g., domain, frequency). 
Figure 1, not shown in the questionnaire but underlying its design, contains 
several dimensions of a risky decision. r is the reference point, xs is the monetary 
outcome of the safe alternative (S), and  s xr −  is the perceived gain or loss associated 
with such outcome. Similarly,  b xr −  and  w xr −  with  bw xx >  are the perceived gains 
or losses of the better and worse outcomes, respectively, of the risky alternative (R). 








  7 
Figure 1. Decision Framework underlying the questionnaire. 
 
xb - r 










The demand characteristics of the survey may create certain distortions or 
selection biases. For example, the fact that the subjects are young or professionally 
successful may explain why health related decisions were infrequent. More 
importantly, the request to think of a decision involving a risky alternative may induce 
subjects to think of a decision where they took the risky alternative, which explains the 
high overall percentage of risky choices (74%). However, the choice of R versus S is 
influenced by other factors, some of which we can identify with independence of this 
selection bias. 
 
Because subjects had to retrieve from their memories a recent decision, the 
availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) may distort the sample, making easily 




Through the descriptions and explanations of the decisions and their 
corresponding outcomes, we classified the decisions into 17 mutually exclusive 
domains. These domains were later combined in two broad groups, named professional 
and private. The specific description of the way in which this classification was made is 
postponed to the next section. 
 
Type of consequence 
 
Early in the questionnaire, subjects were asked to classify the outcomes of 
their decisions according to one or more of the following seven categories: monetary, 
comfort (or discomfort), convenience, time (arriving on time or late, delays, waiting), 




Direct scaling was used to measure the probability of success of the risky 
alternative, p. More precisely, subjects were presented with a linear scale between 0 
and 1, with increments of 10%, and were requested to use a cross to indicate the  
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estimated probability that the better outcome would happen and then to write down this 




The status quo was given by the alternative that was perceived as a default 
alternative, i.e., the alternative that would be chosen if no action would be taken. To 
find the status quo, subjects were requested to decide whether in their decisions: 1) the 
safe alternative was the default alternative, or 2) the risky alternative was the default 
alternative, or 3) neither alternative was the default due to the fact that both alternatives 
required taking some action. 
 
Frequency 
Subjects were asked to estimate the number of decisions of similar importance 
to the one described in the questionnaire that they would make in a given period – day, 
week, month, year and life. The answers were then converted into yearly units, that is, 
number of decisions per year. For instance, the answer of “6 decisions per day” was 
converted into 6*365 = 2190 decisions per year, “5 decisions per month” into 5*12= 60 
decisions per year, while “3 decisions in life” was assumed to be 3/50 = 0.06 decisions 
per year. 
 
Valuation of the outcomes 
In order to have a quantitative measure of the consequences, we requested the 
subjects to provide monetary estimates of the outcomes. Thus, subjects were asked to 
imagine that they had chosen the risky alternative and the worse outcome had 
happened. In this case, they had to provide us with their willingness to pay to replace: 
1) the worse outcome with the better outcome, and 2) the worse outcome with the sure 
outcome. This information provided us with the differences: xb-xw and xs-xw. As a 
double check, subjects were asked to provide us with their willingness to pay to move 
from the sure to the better outcome given that they had previously chosen the safe 
alternative. Their answers provided us with values for xb-xs and xs-xw, which were 
thought to add up to the previous estimate of xb-xw
1. We will explain in the next section 
how we combined these estimates, and used them to calculate a measure of importance 
called stakes. 
 
The attractiveness of the safe alternative q 
Given the description of a decision, a risk neutral decision maker would be 
indifferent between both the safe and risky alternatives whenever p = (xs-xw)/(xb-xw). 
We define q = (xs-xw)/(xb-xw) as the attractiveness of the safe alternative, which gives 
the position of the sure outcome relative to the better and worse outcomes. For non-
trivial decisions q takes values from 0 to 1. Notice that a risk neutral decision maker 
                                                           
1    Undergraduates expressed these values in dollars, whereas MBAs and Executives responded in 
euros. Exchange rates between these two currencies were around one while data was collected, and 
we use euros as the unit of monetary measure.  
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would prefer the risky outcome if and only if  pq ≥ . This observation is easily seen 
when  w rx = , in which case the expected values of S and R  are  () b w q xx −  and 
() b w p xx − , respectively. 
We elicited q using a graphical approach. Specifically, subjects were presented 
with a scaled line as in Figure 2, and asked to estimate the location of the sure outcome 
with respect to the worse and better outcomes in terms of their preferences
2. 
 










0.0    0.1    0.2    0.3    0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9    1.0 
 
Framing 
Framing is related to the locus of the reference point r relative to the 
outcomes, yielding a perception of either gains or losses for each outcome. Overall, the 
decision can be perceived as all-gains, all-losses, or mixed. We asked subjects whether 
they perceived the sure outcome as a gain, a loss, or neutral (neither gains nor losses) 
by ticking one of three check boxes. The framing of the decision was described as gains 
for those subjects reporting the sure outcome to be a gain, losses if the sure outcome 
was perceived as a loss, and mixed if the sure outcome was perceived as neutral. As a 
consistency check, we also asked the subject to classify as gain, loss or neutral the two 
outcomes of R. We eliminated from the analysis of framing 17 cases that showed some 
inconsistency. For example, if the safe alternative was perceived as neutral, then the 
better outcome could not be perceived as a loss, nor the worse outcome be perceived as 




Subjects were asked to write down whether they had chosen the safe or the 
risky alternative. Combining this answer with other dimensions such as framing and 




                                                           
2 It is also possible to estimate q using the monetary valuations of the outcomes. In fact, the following 
three ratios () / () s wb w x xx x −− ,  () / ( () () ) sw bs sw x xx xx x − −+− , and 1( ) / ( ) b sb w x xxx −− −, 
provide estimates of q. If we take the median of these three numbers, and compare this median with the 
scale estimate of q, we find a correlation of 0.56. While this number is somewhat low, our results do not 
change significantly when using either measure, and we decided to use the scale estimate of q. 
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2.3 Preliminary data analysis 
 
In order to describe and analyze the results of the survey, the responses to 
some of the questions were coded. In what follows, we first explain the way we 
encoded the variable domain. Next, we define the stakes, which is a measure of the 
importance of the decision. Finally, we describe how we encoded other dimensions. 
 
Encoding of the domain 
 
The domain of the decisions reported by the subjects was assessed using the 
open-ended question (see elicitation of simple decisions) described in the methods 
section. In other words, subjects were not asked to pigeon-hole their decision in a 
particular domain, but to describe in words their decisions. In order to classify the 
decisions into domains, the authors identified 17 domains, as shown in Table 2. The 17 
domains were combined in two broad categories: professional and private. The 
professional decisions were composed of: business, start MBA, human resources, job, 
protocol, and studying. The rest of domains were labeled as private decisions. The two 
authors independently ascribed each decision to exactly one domain. A handful of 
decisions were classified differently by the two authors. After discussing those cases, 




Stakes or importance of the decision 
 
Intuitively, the importance of a decision is related to the difference between 
the better and the worse outcome,  bw xx − , of the risky alternative, as well as the 
probability of obtaining the better outcome. For example, the decision reported by one 
of the subjects of whether to cycle with helmet (S) or not (R), has “No accident” as the 
better outcome, and “accident + head injury” as the worse outcome. While the 
difference between the better and worse outcome is large, suggesting a high importance 
of the decisions, the low probability of an accident rightly classifies this decision as of 
moderate importance. The standard deviation of a binary lottery, given by 
() ( 1 - ) bw x xp p −⋅ , takes into account the range of consequences, and it decreases as p 
approaches 0 or 1. For easiness of interpretation, we define the stakes (our measure of 
the importance of a decision) as twice the standard deviation of the risky alternative: 
 
STAKES   2 ( ) (1- ) bw x xp p =⋅ − ⋅  
The advantage of this measure is that if p = 0.5, then STAKES coincides with 
the range of outcomes of the risky alternative. A decision with p = 0.2 and 
100 bw xx −=  has stakes equal to 80, which is equivalent to a decision with p = 0.5 and 
80 bw xx −=. Both decisions have a standard deviation of 40. Conversely, a decision 
with stakes equal to 80 can correspond to a p=20% decision with 100 bw xx −= , or a 
p=90% decision with  133.3 bw xx −= ; or a p=50% decision having 80 bw xx −=. We 
suggest that the reader adopt this latter, more intuitive, interpretation of stakes. 
In our survey, we asked directly for a monetary estimate of  bw xx − , but we 
also asked for monetary estimates of  bs xx −  and  sw x x − , whose sum is an indirect  
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estimate of  bw xx − . Although exact agreement between these two measures occurs in 
less than half of the cases, both estimates have the same order of magnitude, and the 
correlation between  () b w Lnx x −  and  (( ) ( )) bs sw Lnx x x x −+−  is 0.95. We average 
these two logarithms to obtain a final estimate of  bw xx − ) ) , i.e., use the geometric mean 
of the direct and indirect estimates.
3 Combining  bw xx − ) )  with  p  yields the stakes. 
 
Encoding of the other dimensions 
 
Except for the numerical dimensions, the others were coded as binary variables. The 
notation “D_” preceding a variable indicates its binary nature. Because multiple choices 
in the type of consequences were allowed, we constructed 7 binary variables, one for 






The analysis and presentation of the results is divided into three parts. In sub-
section 3.1, we present an overview of similarities and differences across the three 
groups with respect to several dimensions. We complement this qualitative analysis 
with the investigation of the relationships between some dimensions. Sub-section 3.2 
examines the influence of framing, status quo, and other variables on the final choice 
by means of a logistic regression model. In sub-section 3.3, we develop a linear 
regression model having the importance of a decision as the dependent variable. The 
predictors are various dimensions of the decisions. 
 
 
3.1 Overall picture and group analysis 
Types of consequences and domain 
 
Figure 3 presents the percentages for the types of consequences for the three 
groups. Given that most experiments are done using monetary rewards, we are 
interested in how many decisions of our survey involve monetary or non-monetary 
consequences. Clearly, aspects other than monetary are involved in most decisions: 
only 11 decisions out of 261 were exclusively monetary, while 37% of decisions were 
entirely non-monetary. 
Furthermore, MBAs and Executives reported that money was involved in 
more than 70% of their decisions, whereas Undergraduates’ decisions with monetary 
consequences accounted for only 35%. The pattern for MBAs and Executives is 
strikingly similar in all the categories (p-value of χ
2 global independence test equals 
0.993). While MBAs and Executives deal primarily with money, followed by career 
and comfort, Undergraduates seem to face consequences related to comfort, socializing, 
and career. Younger people seem mainly concerned with decisions involving their free 
                                                           
3 There were two outliers exhibiting large differences in the order of magnitude of the two estimates. We 
inspected these decisions and chose the more reasonable of the two values. For this analysis, we also 
ruled out those subjects who reported zero values. Five subjects reported that () b w x x −  was 
“everything they could” or “infinite.” Since these answers were not quantifiable, we ruled them out, too.  
  12 
time. As they start taking new responsibilities, social and comfort are replaced by 
monetary aspects. Career and convenience seem to have a constant presence in people’s 
decisions for many years of their lives. 
 
Figure 3. Type of consequences faced by the three groups 






Table 2 reveals that the three groups differ on the domains. As expected, 
Executives reported mostly professional decisions (with an emphasis on business, 
human resources, and job), most Undergraduates’ decisions were in the private domain 
(organization, safety, and ethics), and MBAs’ decisions seem to be more balanced 
between the two domains. 
 
 
p, q, Framing, Status quo, and Final Choice 
 
We calculated the percentages of responses for each of these dimensions and 
used a z-test to evaluate the differences in percentages among the three groups: 
Undergraduates, MBAs and Executives. There were no significant differences in 
percentages among the three groups for all these dimensions. This allowed us to 
aggregate the data and perform the subsequent analysis for the overall percentages (see 
Table 3). 
The aggregate data suggest that, on average, subjects are optimistic regarding 
the probability of success ( 62% p = ). On average, the sure outcome is also closer to 
the better outcome than to the worse outcome ( 57% q = ). The fact that  pq >  implies 
that the “average” risky alternative has a slight advantage in terms of expected value. 
The difference between  p  and q  is statistically significant (t-value = 2.916, p-value = 
0.0037) and subjects seem to respond to this advantage by taking the risky option in 
74% of the cases. However, this percentage seems to be quite high. Therefore, in 
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Our analysis of framing confirms that almost half of the decisions (47%) are 
perceived as mixed, i.e., the reference point coincides with the outcome of the safe 
alternative. In 25% of the cases the safe alternative is perceived as a sure gain, whereas 
in 28% of the decisions the sure outcome is viewed as locking into a loss. 
Paradoxically, mixed gambles involving both gains and losses are empirically less 
understood than all-gains or all-losses gambles (Luce 2000, Wu 2004; Wu and Markle, 
2004). 
Finally, in 55% of the decisions the status quo is the default option. Both 
decisions are perceived as proactive in 30% of the cases, and in the remaining 15% the 
risky decision is the default. The percentage of “Safe is default” seems higher for 
Executives, but a p-value=0.074 of the χ
2-test reveals that there is no reason to reject 
the null hypothesis of independence between groups and the status quo. 
Other cross analyses such as a possible relationship between framing and the 
types of consequences failed to find significant relationships. As will be discussed later, 
no differences between monetary and non-monetary decisions were found. 
 
 
3.2 Factors that influence risk-taking propensity 
What are the drivers behind the choice of the risky or the safe alternative? In 
the tradition of decision analysis, rational decision makers would base their decisions 
primarily on the probability p of the better outcome and the attractiveness q of the safe 
alternative. A risk neutral decision maker, for instance, would choose the risky 
alternative if and only if  pq ≥ . This rational decision maker might not be risk neutral. 
One may conjecture that the higher the stakes the lower the probability of choosing the 
risky alternative due to risk aversion. Other factors such as framing, status quo, and 
gender are not supposed to have an influence. In what follows, we investigate these 
suppositions. 
We first explore how the Risky/Safe choice might depend on domain, framing, 
status quo, and type of consequence (Table 4). Overall, 74% of decisions resulted in the 
choice of the risky alternative. 
The relationship between the final decision and domain seems quite strong. 
Most of the professional decisions resulted in the Risky choice (88%), whereas subjects 
seemed to be more cautious in the private domain (62% of Risky choices). Table 2 
shows the percentage of Risky/Safe choices on the specific domains. We observe a 
clear “selection bias” associated with Start MBA: our sample contains precisely those 
subjects that have chosen the risky option. Decisions in the professional domains, such 
as Business and Human resources, resulted in the Risky choice quite often. Note that in 
these two domains the decisions are taken on behalf of a corporation. A risky behavior 
here is in agreement with decision theory, which ascribes a larger risk tolerance to 
corporations than to individuals. Buy/Sell is the domain with the lowest rates of risk-
taking behavior. Subjects seem to take many precautions in changing suppliers. 
Organization (which refers to everyday arrangements), Personal Investment, and 
Traveling also seems to be associated with the Safe choice. The Risky choice is more 
frequent than the Safe choice in all the other domains. 
We observe the influence of framing in the percentage of risky choices, which 
increases as we move from gains (52%), to mixed (74%), and to losses (92%) framing.  
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This is clear evidence that framing has an influence on risk-taking behavior outside the 
laboratory. 
The influence of the status quo is somewhat puzzling: the percentage of risky 
choices increases when the safe alternative is perceived as default. There is not much 
difference between the cases where the default is the risky alternative and where both 
alternatives were proactive. 
Finally, the type of consequence (monetary or not) does not seem to have any 
impact on risk attitudes. 
To get a better understanding of our data, we fit a binary logistic regression to 
predict the final choice (D_RISKY=1 if the risky choice was made, and 0 otherwise). 
The independent variables are: the dummy for the domain (D_PROFESSIONAL), the 
two dummies for framing (D_LOSS and D_GAIN),  (/ ( 1 ) ) Lnp p − , and  (/ ( 1 ) ) Lnq q − , 
the odds ratio corresponding to p and q. Table 5 summarizes the results, which yields 
the following prediction for the odds ratio of taking the risky choice: 
1.18 0.3
1.14 _ 1.19 _ 0.42 _ Pr( ) 1
 1.19
1P r ( ) 1
Bx D PROFESSIONAL D LOSS D GAIN Risky p q
ee
Risky p q
+− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −
== ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
This model leads to interesting insights. It predicts that the probability of 
choosing the risky alternative should increase with p and decrease with q. The odds 
ratio of the predicted choice increases in direct proportion with  /(1 ) p p − . In fact, the 
coefficient of 1.18 associated to  /(1 ) p p −  is not significantly different from one. 
Pr(Risky) decreases with q, but the coefficient -0.3 indicates that subjects are less 
sensitive to q than they are to p. 
 
Framing has a strong influence on the final choice. Specifically, the odds ratio 
associated to making the Risky choice is multiplied by 3.3 [=exp(1.19)] whenever the 
sure outcome is perceived as a loss (as opposed to mixed). This prediction is in 
agreement with Prospect Theory, which proposes risk seeking behavior for losses. Gain 
framing is not significantly different from mixed framing. If anything, the negative sign 
of the coefficient associated with D_GAIN suggests that subjects are more risk averse 
in all-gains gambles than in mixed gambles. This does not contradict Prospect Theory, 
which exhibits risk averse behavior for both gains and mixed gambles of moderate 
probability. 
Surprisingly, subjects seem to take more risks in professional decisions than in 
private decisions. The odds ratio of taking the Risky choice is multiplied by 3.1 if the 
decision is professional as opposed to private. We checked for possible Start MBA 
selection bias (our sample contains precisely those subjects that have chosen the risky 
option) by removing those decisions and found a similar effect of D_PROFESSIONAL 
(the factor is now 2.96 instead of 3.1, p-value = 0.049). 
Table 6 presents the prediction of choosing the risky alternative. We tried two 
scenarios, the first with p=q=0.5, and the second with p=0.25 and q=0.5. The six 
entries show the probabilities for three framings and two domains. This table uses a 
simplified model where all the non-significant variables (except for q) have been 
omitted. Both domain and loss framing increase Pr(D_RISKY). The probability of  
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choosing the Risky option in a private decision perceived as mixed was of 54%. This 
probability increases to 80% for a private decision with a loss framing. The odds ratio 
moves from 1.19=0.54/0.46 to 3.9=0.8/0.2. This is the increase by a factor of 3.295 
associated with exp(BD_LOSS). The probability of making the Risky choice is 79% if the 
domain is professional, an increase in the odds ratio of 3.121=exp(BD_PROFESSIONAL). 
When  p=0.25 and q=0.5, a risk neutral person would choose the safe 
alternative. In fact, our subjects chose the Risky alternative less than half of the time, 
except for decisions perceived as losses, where the probability of choosing the Risky 
option is 52% and 77%, respectively, for private and professional decisions. 
 
 
3.3 Analyzing the importance of the decisions 
 
We now proceed with the analysis of the dimensions of a decision that 
influence its importance as given by the stakes. Our first concern is with the 
examination of a possible relationship between the frequency of a decision and its 
importance as measured by the stakes. Visual inspection of Figure 4 points to a linear 
relationship between the log of the stakes and the log of the frequency. Different marks 
for different subject groups are used and the three regression lines, one for each group, 
are drawn. These lines suggest that stakes increase as one moves from Undergraduates 
to MBAs and Executives. 
 








To further explore the relationship between the stakes of a decision and its 
dimensions, we employed a linear regression. We regressed the log of the stakes onto 
the main variable given by the log of the frequency, a control variable 
(D_PROFESSIONAL) indicating whether the decision was in this domain, and two 
dummies for groups. Taking MBAs as the reference group, we included the dummy 
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D_EXECUTIVE). Before running the regression, we eliminated from our analysis 
those observations that had missing values in either stakes or frequency variables. In 
this way, we were left with 191 observations. Table 7 reports the results of this 
analysis.
4 All the dependent variables exerted a significant effect on stakes. 
 
Table 8 uses the model in Table 7 to estimate daily and yearly median stakes 
for the private and professional decisions for the three groups. For instance, the median 
stakes of a yearly decision of an MBA student on a private domain are of 2555 euros. 
As expected, frequency exhibited a negative relationship with the stakes, meaning that 
those decisions that are more frequent involve smaller stakes and thus are less 
important. Specifically, the median stakes decrease at a rate that is inversely 
proportional to the frequency to the power of 0.55. For example, the median stakes of a 
daily private decision of an MBA student are of 
0.55 2555 365 102
− ⋅=  euros. 
 
A regression coefficient of -.86 for D_UNDERGRAD indicates that the 
median stakes for the Undergraduates are 0.4 times those of the MBAs. Thus, the 
median stakes of a daily private decision of an undergraduate is of 43 euros, whereas 
the median stakes of a yearly private decision is of 1083 euros. Similarly, the regression 
coefficient D_EXECUTIVE indicates that the median stakes for the Executives is 6.1 
times higher than that of the MBAs. In total, Executives face decisions that are 14.4 
times more important than those of Undergraduates. The median stakes of a daily 
private decision of an executive is of 626 euros, whereas the median stakes of a yearly 
private decision is of 15653 euros. 
 
Domain has an important influence on the importance of a decision. A 
professional domain increases the stakes by a factor of 7.5 relative to a private domain. 
Thus, the median stakes of a yearly professional decision moves from 2555 to 19276 in 
the case of an MBA student. For Undergraduates and Executives, the median stakes of 
a yearly professional decision is of 8173 euros and 118097 euros, respectively. 
 
 
Importance of the specific domains 
 
We modified the previous regression and replaced D_PROFESSIONAL with 
the dummies for all the specific domains except for one (we selected Campout as the 
reference domain). The coefficients of these dummy variables now indicate the 
importance of decision by domain. The slopes of all domains were statistically 
significant except for Leisure and Traveling. Using this model, Figure 5 presents the 
prediction of the median stakes of yearly decisions (Frequency = 1) for the three groups 
and the different domains. 
In general, professional decisions have the highest importance. However, a 
few private domains, namely Safety, Location and Investment, are of higher importance 
than some private domains such as Studying and Protocol. The logarithmic scale is 
important: business decisions are 2.4 (=138/58) times more important than Safety 
decisions, which in turn are 4.5 (=58/12.8) times more important than Buy/Sell 
                                                           
4 We tried an extended model with the variables D_MALE, D_MONEY, D_GAIN, D_LOSS, or 
D_SAFE_DEFAULT, which failed to be significant. In this extended model, the coefficients for the 
current variables were similar, except for D_UNDERGRAD, which was not significant.  
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decisions. Finally, Buy/Sell decisions are 3 (=12.8/4.1) times more important than 
Leisure decisions. 
 











Aggregated importance of daily decisions versus yearly decisions 
 
The study of small daily decisions has received attention recently. For 
instance, Erev and colleagues studied the effect of economic incentives on small but 
consequential repeated decisions. Examples are running red lights (Perry, Erev, and 
Haruvy, 2000), selecting routes (Erev, Barron, and Remington, 2001), and shopping. 
Interestingly, most of the small but frequent decisions in our survey are also related to 
shopping and driving (routes, parking). 
One may wonder if the cumulative impact of these small but frequent 
decisions amount to more than the cumulative impact of very important but less 
frequent decisions (career changes, moving to a new city, etc…). Our linear regression 
model is able to shed light on this question. Initially, assume that, each year, a person 
makes 365 daily decisions and 1 yearly decision. Then, the cumulative stakes involved 
in daily decisions become 365 times the stakes of 1 daily decision. We want to compare 
this number with the stakes of 1 yearly decision. Using the model in Table 7 for an 
MBA student, we see that the cumulative effect of daily decisions is given by 
(1 ) 37282 365 2555/365 2555 365
ff b b − =⋅ = ⋅ , 
where  0.55 f b =  is the coefficient associated with Ln(Freq) obtained in the regression. 
Of course,  0 f b ≥  implies an inverse relationship between importance and frequency. 
The 37282 euros in stakes of 365 daily decisions has to be compared with 2555 euros 
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one typical yearly decision. This conclusion holds as well for the Undergraduates and 
Executives, due to the multiplicative nature of the model. 
Notice that this comparison hinges on whether 
(1 ) 365
f b −  is increasing or not. 
This, of course, depends on whether  f b  is smaller than 1 or not. In our case, 
0.55 1 f b =<  implies that 
0.45 365  is greater than 1; thus, daily decisions (Freq = 365) 
will have higher cumulative effects than yearly decisions (Freq =1). 
 
More in general, if  1 f b <  and  12 Freq Freq > , then the cumulative effects of 
1 Freq -type decisions are higher than the cumulative effects of  2 Freq -type decisions. 
Conversely, if  1 f b > , then the stakes diminish very rapidly with frequency: Important 
but infrequent decisions have higher cumulative effects. Because the 95% confidence 
interval for  f b  is [0.43,0.66], our data yields clear support for  1 f b ≤ . These 
observations also hold if one makes 10 daily decisions and 10 yearly decisions. 
However, if the number of decisions of each frequency-type are different, then the 
appropriate adjustments have to be made.
5 
 
Status quo, type of consequences, and group are unrelated to risk attitudes 
We have already seen that framing matters for risky choice. However, do other 
factors such as group and monetary consequences matter? In Table 9 we present an 
expanded logistic regression model. We have not included Ln(Stakes) because it 
reduces the number of observations from 212 to 160, and, once included, turns out not 
to be significant. The same can be said for Gender. Besides confirming that the 
coefficients of the variables in Table 6 are stable, we find no other significant factors. 
Specifically, once we account, the status-quo variable (D_SAFE_DEFAULT= 1 if safe 
is the default, 0 otherwise) has no significant influence on the final decision. 
Table 4 suggests that the presence of monetary consequences does not help in 
predicting the final choice. This remark is confirmed by the fact that the variable 
D_MONEY, which distinguishes monetary from non-monetary decisions, is not 
significant (see Table 9). The variables D_COMFORT, …, D_CAREER do not have a 
significant influence once we account for framing and domain. This finding is 
encouraging: it reveals that the insights obtained in laboratory experiments using 
monetary consequences can be extended to other types of consequences. Thus, while 
we confirm that domain of the decision influences risk attitudes, we find evidence that 
the type of consequence (monetary, time, comfort, etc…) has little or no influence on 
risk attitudes. 
                                                           
5 In this case, one could let  () n Freq  be the number of decisions of this given frequency that one 
person makes per year. For example,  (365) 730 n =  corresponds to making 730 decisions per year of 
daily importance (Freq1=  365), i.e., an average of two daily-type decisions per day;  and  (1) 3 n =  
indicates 3 yearly-type decisions (Freq2=1) per year. The critical ratio to support the conclusion 
that Freq1-type decisions amount to more than Freq2-type decisions is: 
 
  11 22 () () () () n Freq Stakes Freq n Freq Stakes Freq ⋅≥ ⋅, 
 
which, using our regression model, becomes  121 2 () / () (/ )
f b n Freq n Freq Freq Freq ≥ .  
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Finally, the fact that the variables controlling for group are not significant 
implies that risk attitudes do not vary across our three groups. This is reassuring, 
showing that experiments performed with Undergraduates or MBAs can be 
extrapolated to other groups such as Executives. 
 
 
Status quo and reference points 
 
In a series of experiments, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) showed an 
exaggerated preference for the status quo (what is implemented if nothing is done), 
which they justified using loss aversion. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros and Kunreuther 
(1993) showed this status quo bias with field data on insurance choices. The link 
between loss aversion and status quo assumes that the status quo outcome and the 
reference point are identical. While this identification can be easily induced in artificial 
laboratory experiments, we want to verify whether our survey data supports this 
assumption. 
 
Table 10 shows the relationship between the status quo and framing. As 
argued previously, the Safe alternative tends to become the reference point (49%). This 
percentage increases to 54% if the Safe alternative is the default, and decreases to 42% 
if not. While status quo is related to framing (χ
2-test yields a p-value= 0.000071), a 
change from 42% to 54% suggest that the link between the status quo and reference 
point is not as strong as one may think. Moreover, the data in Table 4 squarely 
contradict the status quo bias: when the Safe alternative is the default, 81% of the 
subjects chose the Risky option, whereas when the Safe is not the default, only 64% 
chose Risky. 
While we observe that the status quo has some influence in setting the framing 
of a decision, we confirm that framing, and not status quo, is the driver of the risk 
attitude. In fact, the variable D_SAFE_DEFAULT is not significant in the expanded 
logistic regression model of Table 9. Thus, the influence of the status quo on risk 
attitude is indirect in nature and, in our study, not significant. This finding suggests that 
the reported attractiveness of the default options (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003) might 




5. Final Remarks 
 
Previous empirical studies on attitudes toward risk that are relevant to our 
study include Hershey and Schoemaker (1980, 1984), MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1986) and March and Shapira (1987). These studies provide empirical evidence on 
how managers define risk, their attitudes toward risk, and how they deal with risks. 
Regarding attitudes toward risk –the issue that we also consider– some of our results 
can be seen as a confirmation of theirs. Our results support and extend the findings of 
both MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) and March and Shapira (1987), who studied 
the case of managers. As did they, we found strong evidence for framing. However, we 
are unable to observe interactions between framing and stakes (March and Shapira, 
1986; Kühberger et al., 2002; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). This confirms that 
framing effects occur in both actual and hypothetical choices (Kühberger et al., 2002). 
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The influence of the content domain of a decision problem on the outcome of 
the decision has been investigated by Rettinger and Hastie (2001). In their experiment, 
subjects exhibited differences in risk attitudes on the four content domains considered: 
gamble, stock, grade (school) and legal. For instance, subjects were risk averse in the 
gamble scenario and risk seeking in the stock scenario, whereas on the other two 
domains the risk attitudes were more evenly distributed. We push forward their 
investigation by illustrating that domain, together with framing, is a psychologically 
relevant factor in risk attitude. While framing has received lots of attention, domain has 
been relatively unexplored. 
 
Fagley and Miller (1990) looked at gender differences in choices in decision 
problems involving outcomes such as human life or death, dropping out of school and 
job loss. Their findings confirmed the prospect theoretical predictions regarding the 
framing effects for women but not for men, regardless of the domain of the decision 
and the risk propensity of the subjects. We find no gender differences in that both 
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Appendix A - Tables 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of subjects. 
  UNDERGRAD  MBAs  EXECUTIVES TOTAL 
N  77  131  53 261 
Median age  24.5  28  36 28 
Country  86% USA 
30 diff. 
countries  91% Spain    
GENDER  #  %  #  %  #  % #  % 
Female  35 
45
%  36 
27





Male  42 
55
%  95 
73
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Table 2: Domain of the decisions for the different groups. 
 
 
                                                           
6 Examples of protocol are “to attend dinner after the interview / not attend”, or “abide with supervisor / 
confront him”.
 
7  Since our questionnaire asked subjects to recall a risky decision, a few of them reported leisure 
decisions involving risky sports like sky diving or paddling in the open ocean. 
8 Several undergraduates had participated in a campout activity just before filling out the questionnaire. 












(assignment of tasks, choose 
collaborators, organizing 
subordinates) 
-  -  19%  4%  100% 
START MBA (keep current job 
or start MBA) 
-  29%  -  15%  94% 
BUSINESS (decisions made in 
the current job) 
-  2%  28%  7%  73% 
JOB (change job or not)  4%  8%  30%  11%  88% 
PROTOCOL (how to deal with 
superiors
6) 














STUDYING (continue education 
or not) 
12%  2%  -  5%  73% 
SAFETY (undertake laser eye 
surgery, driving after drinking, wear 
helmet) 
12%  2%  -  4%  90% 
LOCATION (move to another 
city/country or not) 
6%  3%  2%  4%  50% 
INVESTMENT (investing 
personal wealth) 
-  7%  2%  4%  70% 
RELATIONSHIP (continue/start 
or not a relationship) 
6%  3%  2%  4%  37% 
BUY_SELL (whether to buy/sell 
something and choice of supplier) 
6%  10%  2%  7%  79% 
FLAT RENTAL (rent a flat or 
wait for other opportunities) 
-  11%  2%  6%  75% 
ETHICS (tell the truth, break the 
law) 
8%  -  -  2%  48% 
ORGANIZATION (planning of 
activities, scheduling, do now/do 
later) 




6%  6%  -  5%  57% 
TRAVELLING 
(traveling/vacation decisions) 









CAMPOUT (campout or do 
something else
8) 
16%  -  -  5%  80%  
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  UNDERGRADS  MBAs  EXECUTIVES TOTAL 
Avg. Probability p  61%  63%  59% 62% 
Avg. Attractiveness 
q  60%  55%  55% 57% 
FINAL CHOICE         
RISKY  69%  76%  75%  74% 
SAFE  31%  24%  25%  26% 
FRAMING         
GAIN  29%  24%  21%  25% 
NEUTRAL  51%  41%  55%  47% 
LOSS  20%  35%  25%  28% 
STATUS QUO         
SAFE DEFAULT  47%  57%  62%  55% 
BOTH 
PROACTIVE  32%  28%  34%  30% 
RISKY DEFAULT  21%  15%  4%  15%  
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Table 4: Cross analysis for the final choice (Risky or Safe) with domain, framing and status quo. 
  RISKY  SAFE 
TOTAL  74%  26% 
DOMAIN     
PRIVATE  62%  38% 
PROFESSIONAL  88%  12% 
FRAMING     
GAIN  52%  48% 
NEUTRAL  74%  26% 
LOSS  92%  8% 
STATUS QUO     
SAFE DEFAULT  81%  19% 
SAFE NOT DEFAULT  64%  36% 
MONEY     
MONETARY  74%  26% 
NON-MONETARY  73%  27% 
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Table 5. Logistic regression model predicting the probability of making the Risky choice as 
a function of domain and framing. 
 
Pr(D_RISKY) B p-value  Exp(B) 
Ln(p/(1-p)) 1.179 2E-07 - 
Ln(q/(1-q)) -0.295  0.1685 - 
D_PROFESSIONAL 1.138  0.0111 3.121 
D_LOSS 1.193  0.0368 3.295 
D_GAIN -0.425  0.3775 0.654 
Constant 0.176  0.5706 1.193 
 
N=212; Nagelkerke R





  29 
Table 6. Probability of making the Risky choice as a function of domain and framing. 









p = 0.5; q = 0.5    
PRIVATE (=1) 44%  54%  80% 
PROFESSIONAL (×3.1) 71% 79% 92% 
p = 0.25; q =0.5     
PRIVATE (=1) 18%  25%  52% 
PROFESSIONAL (×3.1) 40% 50% 77% 
 
Table 7. Regression results for Ln(STAKES) as a function of the Ln(FREQUENCY), the 
groups (D_UNDEGRAD, D_EXECUTIVE), and the broad domain (D_PROFESSIONAL).  
 
 Ln(STAKES) B p-value  Exp(B) 
(Constant) 7.846 0.000  2555.0 
LN(FREQUENCY) -0.546 0.000  - 
D_UNDERGRAD -0.858 0.011  0.42 
D_EXECUTIVE 1.813 0.000  6.13 
D_PROFESSIONAL 2.021 0.000  7.54 
 
N=191; R
2 = 0.644 
Undoing the log transformation yields the median prediction: 
-0.86 _UNDERGRAD 1.81 _EXECUTIVE 2.02 _PROFESSIONAL 
0.55
2555 e e e
STAKES = 
FREQUENCY
DD D ⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅
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Table 8. Prediction of the median stakes (in euros) of a decision taken by different subjects 
on either private or professional domains. Daily decisions (Freq.=365) are compared with 










PRIVATE (=1) 43 € 102  € 626  € 
PROFESSIONAL (×7.5) 327 €  771 € 4,721  € 
YEARLY (×Freq
-0.55= 1)     
PRIVATE 1,083 € 2,555  € 15,653  € 
PROFESSIONAL 8,173 € 19,276  € 118,097  € 
 
 
Table 9. Expanded logistic regression model predicting the probability of making the Risky choice. 
 
Pr(D_RISKY) B p-value  Exp(B) 
Ln (p/(1-p)) 1.184 4E-07 - 
Ln (q/(1-q)) -0.312  0.1572 - 
D_PROFESSIONAL 1.425 0.0073 4.156 
D_LOSS 1.127 0.0537 3.087 
D_GAIN -0.430  0.3911 0.651 
D_SAFE_DEFAULT 0.172 0.6786 1.188 
D_MONEY -0.159  0.7308 0.853 
D_EXECUTIVE -0.653  0.247 0.520 
D_UNDERGRAD 0.144 0.7838 1.155 
Constant 0.220 0.699 1.246 
 
N=212; Nagelkerke R
2 = 0.446; Overall correctly classified = 0.807  
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SAFE IS NOT 
DEFAULT  TOTAL 
N  134  108 242 
FRAMING      
GAIN  12%  38%  24% 
NEUTRAL  54%  42%  49% 
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Appendix B - SURVEY ON A DECISION 
 
Q0- Individual Information 
   Female   Male 
 Age:  _____  years 
  Country of origin: _________________ 
 Education  background: 
   Humanities: History, Languages, …  
   Economics, Business, Political Science, …  
   Life Sciences: Medicine, Biology, … 
   Sciences: Engineering, Physics, … 




The objective of this questionnaire is to study the decisions that people like you 
make. In particular, we are interested in a decision that you recently made and that involved 
the choice between two alternatives: a “safe” alternative and a “risky” alternative. In such a 
decision you get to choose one of the two alternatives. If you choose the safe alternative then 
a single known outcome ensues. In contrast, if you choose the risky alternative, then several 
outcomes may occur, and is not under your control to decide which one will finally happen. 
In order to simplify the description, please focus on the two main distinct 
alternatives (safe and risky) that you considered at the time. If the decision that you have in 
mind cannot be simplified in just two such alternatives or choices, then think of some other 
decisions. 
You may want to quickly scan through the questionnaire to get a feel for the ten 
questions that you will be facing. 
Now, think of a decision or problem that you made recently involving two main 
alternatives, one of them being safe, the other being risky. 
Q1- Please describe briefly this decision: _____________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
The safe alternative was:___________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
The risky alternative was: __________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
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Q2- The outcomes or consequences of this decision had to do with (check all that apply): 
 Monetary gains or expenses. 
 Comfort or discomfort.   Convenience. 
 Time: arriving on time or late, delays, waiting. 
 Social consequences: fame, embarrassment. External appearance. 
 Career or profession. 
 Other: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Q3- Please describe the “sure outcome” associated with the safe alternative: 
Sure outcome:       _______________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                             
Consider the risky alternative. Summarize the possible outcomes of the risky alternative in two 
scenarios or outcomes: a good luck scenario or “better outcome” and a bad luck scenario or “worse 
outcome”. Please describe the two-scenario outcomes of the risky alternative: 
Better outcome: ____________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Worse outcome: ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Note: If the risky alternative cannot be simplified in two scenarios, then answer 
questions Q5, Q6, Q10, and finish the questionnaire. Otherwise answer all the 
questions. 
Q4- At the moment of the decision, what was your judgment of the chances that the better outcome of 
the risky alternative would result? (Use a cross (X) to indicate in the line below the estimated 
probability of the better outcome). 
 
0%  100%  50%   
 
Please write your estimate of this probability, p = ____%. Of course, if p is your estimate of the 
chances of the better outcome, then 1-p is your estimate of the chances of the worse outcome. 
Q5- A default or non-proactive alternative is the one actually chosen if nothing is done. (Check the 
one box that applies): 
 The safe alternative was the default alternative. 
 The risky alternative was the default alternative. 
 There was no default alternative because both alternatives required taking some action.  
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Q6- The importance of the decision that you are describing is (Check one) 
   Small   Moderate   High   Very high 
Although this decision may be unique, I have made or expect to make _______ (number) decisions of 
similar importance during the course of (check the time scale so that the number is below 10). 
   one day   one week   one month   one year   my life 
Q7- Valuation of the outcomes. Even though this decision may not have to do with money, we may 
measure its importance using monetary values. Assume that you took the risky alternative and that the 
worse outcome actually happened. What is the most you would be willing to pay to reverse your bad 
luck, namely, to replace the worse outcome for the better outcome?  $ ________. 
And to replace the worse outcome for the sure outcome?  $ ________. 
Assume that you took the safe alternative and now have the sure outcome. What is the most you 
would be willing to pay to move from the sure outcome to the better outcome?  $ ________. 
Q8- In the line below, the location of the two risky outcomes indicates that the better outcome is 
preferred to the worse outcome. Please, use a cross (X) to estimate the location of the sure outcome 
with respect to the worse and better in terms of preference. 
 
I prefer the worse outcome 
to the sure outcome. 
I prefer the better outcome to the sure outcome, 
and the sure outcome to the worse outcome. 
I prefer the sure outcome 






Q9- Perception of the Outcomes 
9.1- How did you perceive the “sure outcome” in the safe alternative? (Check one) 
   As a gain.   As a loss.   Neutral (neither a gain nor a loss). 
9.2- How did you perceive the “better outcome” in the risky alternative? (Check one) 
   As a gain.   As a loss.   Neutral (neither a gain nor a loss). 
9.3- How did you perceive the “worse outcome” in the risky alternative? (Check one) 
   As a gain.   As a loss.   Neutral (neither a gain nor a loss). 
 
In the line of Q8 above, please indicate with a circle (O) the location that you would regard as neutral 
(neither a gain nor a loss). This means that you would perceive the outcomes to the right of “O” as a 
gain, and the outcomes to the left of “O” as a loss. Of course, if one of the three outcomes above has 
been marked as neutral, then mark the “O” on top of this one outcome. 
Q10- Which alternative did you choose?   The safe alternative /   The risky alternative. 
If the uncertainty has been resolved, what happened? ____________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Other comments (surprises or unanticipated events regarding the eventual outcomes, important 
aspects of the decision not reported here, …): __________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 